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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Samuel Conan Reed appeals from his judgment and sentence entered 
upon his conviction of felony DUI at trial. Specifically, Reed challenges the 
district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Reed pled guilty to his first DUI in Valley County, Idaho, in 2004, and the 
court withheld judgment. (R., p. 35-36.) After successfully completing two years 
probation, the court dismissed the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. (R., p. 40.) 
The district court's order, which forms the basis for this appeal, read, in relevant 
part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, That 
Defendant's former plea of guilty is unconditionally withdrawn, and 
the plea is deemed as though it had never been tendered to or 
accepted by the Court, Defendant's plea of not guilty is reinstated in 
U U ~ C ~ .  this matter, and the matier is heieby dismissed, with p:ejild' 
(R., p. 40.) 
Approximately three months after his first case was dismissed, Reed was 
charged with his second DUI. (R., p. 51.) The state also charged an 
enhancement in that case, which Reed unsuccessfully sought to have dismissed 
on the grounds that his first DUI had been dismissed and could not be used for 
enhancement purposes. (Id.) In that case, the district court rejected his 
argument and Reed pled guilty to the second, enhanced DUI. (Id.) 
Reed was charged with felony DUI in the instant case on February 6, 
2008. (R., pp. 29-30.) The state alleged that Reed had previously pled guilty to 
or had been found guilty of at least two violations of Idaho's DUI statutes within 
the previous ten years. (Id.) Reed filed a motion to dismiss (R., pp. 35-37), - 
asserting that the order of dismissal in his first DUI "did effectively remove the 
guilty plea from the record, unconditionally and absolutely, and did reinstate 
Defendant's former plea of not guilty, and upon that state of the record, the 
matter was then dismissed with prejudice" (R., p. 36). He asserted, "[tlhe direct 
purpose and effect of that Order was to eliminate any consequence of a plea . . . 
and that event of a plea, being ordered withdrawn and deemed never tendered to 
or accepted by the Court is treated as being vacated, set aside, and withdrawn 
... ." (Id.) Thus, he reasoned, the plea could not be used for enhancement 
purposes. (Id.) 
In the state's response to the defendant's memorandum, the state 
asserted that the order dismissing the first DUI exceeded the statutory authority 
permitted by I.C. 5 19-2604 and that a case dismissed pursuant to a withheld 
judgment does not preclude the use of that case as a "prior DUI" in a later DUI 
proceeding under § 18-8005(5). (R., pp. 50-58.) After a hearing at which the 
district court heard argument from both parties (see generally, 5/28/08 Tr.), the 
district court denied Reed's motion to dismiss, holding that a plea dismissed 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 could be used for enhancement purposes (R., pp. 72- 
75). 
Reed requested permission to appeal the district court's order, which was 
granted by the district court. (R., pp. 77-79, 82-83.) Although unclear from the 
record, it appears that Reed's permissive appeal was not granted by the 
Supreme Court, and his case proceeded to trial. Reed was found guilty of DUI 
by jury and later admitted the enhancement. (R., pp. 95, 97-98.) The district 
court sentenced Reed to ten years with two years fixed, suspended the 
sentence, and placed Reed on ten years probation. (R., pp. 108-13.) Reed 
timely appealed. (R., pp. 11 8-22.) 
Reed states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the Final Order of May 16, 2006, entered by the 
Honorable Henry R. Boomer, Ill, Magistrate, Valley County, Idaho, 
had effectively removed and eliminated the plea of guilt from the 
record of those proceedings and entitled Mr. Reed to a complete 
expungement to prevent the subsequent use thereof in conjunction 
with the penalty enhancement provisions of Idaho's DUI Statute 18- 
8005, Idaho Code. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Reed failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to dismiss because the district court concluded that, despite Reed having 
obtained an I.C. 5 19-2604(1) dismissal of a prior DUI, that the prior DUI could 
still be used to enhance the current DUI charge? 
ARGUMENT 
Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
-- - 
To Dismiss Because The District Court Concluded That, Despite Reed Havinq 
Obtained An I.C. 6 19-2604(1) Dismissal Of A Prior DUI, That The Prior DUI 
Could Still Be Used To Enhance The Current DUI Charqe 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Reed's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court 
ruled that, despite Reed having obtained an I.C. § 19-2604 dismissal on a prior 
DUI, that the prior DUI could still be used for enhancement purposes. Reed 
challenges the district court ruling on appeal, arguing as he did below that the 
dismissed DUI cannot be used to enhance his current DUI due to the language 
used in the court's order dismissing the prior DUI. The district court correctly 
concluded that, despite the language used in the court's order, Reed's prior DUI 
could be used for enhancement purposes and that Reed was properly charged. 
B. Standard of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
ldaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 11 15, 11 17 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 ldaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denvinq His 
Motion To Dismiss Because The District Court Concluded That, Despite 
Reed Having Obtained An I.C. 5 19-2604(1) Dismissal Of A Prior DUI, 
That The Prior DUI Could Still Be Used To Enhance The Current DUI 
Charge 
ldaho Code 5 18-8005(6) reads, in relevant part: 
[Alny person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004(l)(a)(b) or (c), ldaho Code, who 
previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) 
or more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(l)(a)(b) or 
(c), ldaho Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation, or any combination thereof, within ten (10) years, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s) shall be guilty of a felony[.] 
(emphasis added). Reed concedes that he has previously been found guilty or 
has pled guilty to two or more violations of the ldaho DUI statutes. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 1.) However, he contends that, because of the language of the order 
withdrawing his guilty plea and dismissing his case, his first DUI was "expunged" 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) and cannot be used for enhancement purposes. 
ldaho Code 5 19-2604(1) reads, in relevant part: 
If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has 
been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon 
satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied 
with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation . . . the cotirt may, if convinced by :he showing made that 
there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and 
if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or 
set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant . . . . 
Although the statute gives the trial court authority set aside a guilty plea 
and enter an order of dismissal upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant 
that he has complied at all times with the terms and conditions of probation, such 
a dismissal and setting aside of a guilty plea is not a determination that the 
defendant is factually innocent, nor is it based on any error in the legal 
proceedings. State v. Woodbu~ ,  141 ldaho 547, 548-49, 112 P.3d 835, 836-87 
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Perkins, 135 ldaho 17, 21, 13 P.3d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 
2000). Rather, it is simply an exercise of leniency by the court, the effect of 
which is to "restor[e] the defendant to his civil rights." I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
Had the legislature intended a dismissal order entered pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2604(1) to operate as a permanent expungement of the defendant's record 
for all purposes, it could easily have done so by the simple expedient of including 
language in the statute to the effect that the defendant's conviction "shall be 
deemed never to have occurred." Compare I.C. § 20-525A (providing for 
expungement of juvenile record and stating: "Upon entry of [an expungement 
order] the proceedings in the petitioner's case shall be deemed never to have 
occurred ...."). The legislature did not do so, however, and, in fact, has 
evidenced its intent in a number of other statutes that although a Section 19- 
2604(1) dismissal cleanses the defendant's record to some extent, it does not 
entirely remove the adjudication of guilt for all purposes. See Woodbury, 141 
ldaho at 549, 112 P.3d at 837 (citing examples of statutes in which "the ldaho 
legislature has specified that . . . a withheld judgment will be treated as a prior 
conviction in the event of subsequent crimes. . . . and for other purposes."). 
It is well established that a DUI dismissed pursuant to a withheld judgment 
does not preclude the state from using that earlier DUI to enhance a subsequent 
DUI. See State v. Deitz, 120 ldaho 755, 819 P.2d 1155 (Ct. App. 1991). Indeed, 
"the legislature has clearly expressed its intent that a determination of guilty 
which is followed by an order withholding judgment, even though a judgment may 
never be entered, is a determination of guilt under the statute." Deitz, 120 ldaho 
at 756, 819 P.2d at 1156. There is no dispute that Reed pled guilty to a previous 
DUI in Valley County, ldaho or that he received a withheld judgment from the 
court. Thus, he is a person who "previously has been found guilty or has pled 
guilty" to a previous DUI. As a result, the only issue before this court is whether 
or not the order purporting to withdraw Reed's prior plea of guilty and reinstating 
his plea of not guilty in Reed's prior DUI case defeats the enhancing provisions of 
I.C. § 18-8005(6). 
In support of his position, Reed relies on State v. Deitz, 120 ldaho 755, 
819 P.2d 1155 (Ct. App. 1991). (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) In Deitz, the 
defendant claimed that a prior DUI could not be used to enhance his current DUI 
because he had received a withheld judgment on the prior DUI and it was 
ultimately dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. Deitz, 120 ldaho at 756, 819 
P.2d at 1156. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It considered the purpose 
behind both the expungment statute and the enhanced DUI penalty statute and 
noted that the purpose was the same: to encourage rehabilitation and deter 
recidivism. Deitz, 120 ldaho at 757, 819 P.2d at 1157. It further observed that 
"[slince 1924 our courts have held that the statutes providing for withheld 
judgments and the dismissal of charges were not designed to benefit repeat 
offenders." Id., 120 ldaho at 758, 81 9 P.2d at 1 158. 
Finally, and most importantly for Reed's argument, the Deitz court held 
that although the withheld judgment had been dismissed, the guilty plea had not 
been specifically set aside. Deitz, 120 ldaho at 757, 819 P.2d at 1157. It 
concluded that the "historical fact that Deitz had pled guilty to the DUI charge 
remained operative for [enhancement purposes]." 
Reed attempts to distinguish his case from Dietz and argues that, unlike 
the defendant in Deitz, his guilty plea was unconditionally withdrawn and set 
aside and his not guilty plea was reinstated, and thus, his prior DUI cannot be 
used to enhance his current charge. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) However, the 
ldaho Supreme Court has found no difference between dismissing a withheld 
judgment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) and setting aside or withdrawing a guilty 
plea pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), and has essentially eliminated any limitation 
in the Deitz holding. 
Although the issue has not been addressed in the context of the DUI 
enhancement provisions located at I.C. § 18-8005, any distinction between 
dismissal of the judgment and withdrawal of the guilty plea was discussed in the 
context of the sex offender registration statutes in State v. Robinson, 143 ldaho 
306, 142 P.3d 729 (2006). In Robinson, the defendant asserted that he was not 
required to register as a sex offender because his guilty plea had been set aside 
and the underlying charge had been dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. 
Robinson, 143 ldaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. In rejecting this argument, the 
court noted that a dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) was not a 
determination that the defendant was innocent and recognized that a withheld 
judgment was treated as a prior conviction for many different types of offenses. 
Robinson, 143 ldaho at 308, 142 P.3d at 731. 
It then addressed the crucial distinction that Reed attempts to make 
between a dismissal of the charge and a withdrawal of the plea: "[Tlhe fact that a 
defendant later receives leniency under I.C. § 19-2604(1) does not remove him 
from the registration act. It does not matter what form the leniency takes, be i t  
dismissing the charges or allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea or both." 
Robinson, 143 ldaho at 310, 142 P.3d at 733 (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court explained: 
If a case has been dismissed, there is no longer anything in which a 
judgment of conviction can stand; likewise, if a charge has been 
dismissed there no longer remains a conviction for that charge. An 
order purporting to dismiss a criminal case without vacating the 
conviction is invalid, and a guilty plea in a criminal case would 
necessarily be vacated once the dismissal in the underlying 
criminal case is final. 
Id. Thus, the distinction that is necessary for Reed to succeed on appeal - the 
-
difference between a withdrawn guilty plea and a dismissal - has been rejected 
by the ldaho Supreme Court. 
The reasoning of Robinson applies equally to the DUI enhancement 
statutes. Of particular note, the definition of "conviction" used in the sex offender 
registration statutes is identical to that used in the DUI enhancement penalty 
statute: that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding 
the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. See I.C. § 18-8005(6), I.C. § 18- 
Additionally, the Robinson court recognized that although the legislature 
could have created a registration exception for those who obtain dismissal 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) it did not do so. Robinson, 143 ldaho at 310, 142 
P.2d at 733. It also noted that because I.C. § 19-2604(1) was a legislative 
creation the leniency it affords offenders could be limited by other legislative acts. 
Id. Likewise, the leniency afforded by I.C. § 19-2604(1) has been limited by the 
-
DUI enhanced penalty statute. The legislature could have created an I.C. § 19- 
2604(1) exception in the DUI enhanced penalty statute but did not. 
Reed pled guilty to and was found guilty of the Valley County DUI, 
bringing him within the purview of the DUI enhanced penalty statute. The later 
withdrawal of his plea and dismissal of his case pursuant to I.C. 519-2604(1) is of 
no consequence because there is, ultimately, no difference between a withdrawn 
plea and a case dismissed under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Thus, the district court's 
conclusion that Reed's Valley County DUI, despite having been dismissed 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), was properly used to enhance his current felony 
DUI charge was correct. Reed has failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Samuel Conan Reed's 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 30th day of June 2010. 
~ e p d y  Attorney General N 
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